EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS: A NEW WAY OF THINKING AND FIGHTING. by MAJ Leonard D. Rickerman, U.S. Army, 46 pages. This paper analyzes Effects-Based Operations as the most effective way to frame future joint operations in a complex, uncertain environment. This new complex and uncertain environment is characterized by adversaries who have increasingly more access to weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects and whose actions will likely be very unpredictable, and could directly threaten the American homeland. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld stated that, "such new, unexpected and dangerous adversaries must be dissuaded, deterred, and defeated without undue cost to American interests abroad or attacks on the U.S. homeland." In a speech presented March 2002, on transformation he stated that what is needed now at the threshold of the 21 st Century is a "new way of thinking and a new way of fighting." The Joint Forces Command has adopted and continues to evolve the concept of EBO within a Joint warfighting construct to answer in part to both challenges.
INTRODUCTION
Transformation ascertains that a new paradigm or way of thinking about warfighting is required due to the changing threat, strategic environment, and new ideas, which continue to challenge the way we think about warfighting. Throughout history, war has remained constant as the most complex and ruthless human endeavor. It has been and will remain a crucible in which men are maimed and killed, things are destroyed, and nations are defeated. What is different, is how the U.S. Military perceives and thinks about warfare and how it will continue to evolve the conduct of military operations. New ideas such as complexity and systems theory and Service operational concepts like the Air Force's Global Strike Task Force, the Navy's Network Centric Warfare, the Army's Objective Force, and the Marines Operational Maneuver from the Sea are currently challenging the way the Department of Defense (DoD) thinks about warfighting. 1 The DoD plans to transform the force over the years ahead by making organizational changes and adopting new operational concepts that can exploit modern technological advances. Warfighting (JOW). USJFCOM states that JOW is designed to leverage and integrate potential and projected improvements in doctrine, technology, and warfighting culture as they apply to the battle space, operations, and command. It is focused on setting conditions for adaptability in the complex and uncertain environment of the future. 2 JOW is the primary focus of transformation, which continues to develop joint warfighting capabilities that will improve the ability of future force commanders to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and important operational missions. JOW incorporates and advances the operational concept of Effects Based Operations, which seeks to plan, prepare and execute military operations oriented on what effects must be achieved to bring about the desired strategic outcomes.
EBO as a concept is developing rapidly and becoming better understood throughout the Joint Forces Command has embraced EBO as a broad concept that includes all means of employing national power, military and non-military focused on a desired effect on an enemy throughout the spectrum of conflict. JFCOM is presently developing a conceptual basis for effects-based operations as a precursor to future experimentation and inclusion in joint doctrine. 3 The JFCOM Joint Experimentation Directorate has furthered integration of EBO by writing Effects Based Planning Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Final Draft) and Effects Assessment: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Draft). Both of these papers were 2 
Ibid.p. 4.
incorporated into the conduct of experimentation during Millennium Challenge 02. Though EBO is currently in the beginning stages of development, this paper attempts to answer whether EBO within the framework of JOW is the most effective way to frame future joint operations in a complex, uncertain environment.
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REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGE
Future operations are addressed in the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, published September 30, 2001 , which emphasizes the requirement for the U.S. security apparatus to adapt to new challenges. 5 The report requires transformation in the way the military will think and fight in the perceived future environment. The report specifically states that the U.S. military forces must maintain the ability to assure allies, dissuade adversaries, deter aggressors, and defeat any adversary if deterrence were to fail, while modernizing the force and exploiting the revolution in military affairs. 6 In an article published in PHALANX, March 2002, Major General Dean Cash, Director of Joint Experimentation, Joint Forces Command stated that "The new policy of dissuasion as articulated by the SECDEF will require a new way of thinking about conflict resolution and the application of National power… The concept of EBO may be this new way of thinking that will allow us to achieve this end-state of dissuasion."
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Future warfighting concepts to include EBO are evolving in anticipation and response to the changing Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and potential adversaries. This paper begins analysis of EBO by exploring its evolution in response to the COE and emerging technologies. USJFCOM defines today's adversary as a dynamic, adaptive foe who draws his will and capability to conduct operations from an integrated system of political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESI2) systems. They go on to explain that there are key nodes and vulnerabilities within those systems that if engaged with the proper action will generate the effects, which achieve our mission and objectives. 8 The targeting of these effects are the basis for EBO because EBO is highly efficient at achieving basic goals with limited investments and calculated risks to lives and national treasure. Consequently, new warfighting concepts are evolving because of the two primary driving factors which are: (1) technology has profoundly increased the means to gather, integrate and apply information and knowledge; and (2) the world is increasingly becoming networked and interdependent resulting in vulnerabilities of direct and indirect, desirable and undesirable effects. 10 Technology and globalization can also provide the opportunity for the U.S. to shape our environment and minimize challenges to U.S. interests.
The technological revolution is shaping the environment of the United States and forcing worldwide change. Technology has increased the speed of interconnectivity around the world and has changed the magnitude, complexity, and rapidity of awareness and its positive and negative effects. Technology is advancing the U.S. into an expanded realm of Information Operations (IO). John Arquilla in his book In Athena's Camp described Cyberwar and Netwar as models for future warfare. His basic premise is that the information revolution is redefining how societies and or militaries may wage war in the future. 11 EBO is one of the only concepts that integrates the tenants of IO ensuring the nation is capable of taking actions that will achieve explicit policy aims while mitigating unanticipated or unintended consequences.
Additionally globalization has symbiotically tied individuals, businesses, and governments into becoming more interconnected, interdependent, and susceptible to influence from an outside source. LtCol Hammes wrote an article titled "The Evolution of War: The
Fourth Generation" in which he supports the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).
4GW roughly delineates a difference in warfare due to future enemy forces being something other than a military force organized and operating under the control of a national government and whose cause may be based on an ideology or religion, which often transcends national boundaries. LtCol Hammes surmises that there has been an exponential increase in the number of transnational business associations, research groups, academic societies, and even hobbyists who maintain contact through a wide variety of media. Because these networks tie people together in distinctly nontraditional ways, we can no longer conduct international affairs primarily through official diplomatic and military channels.
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LtCol Hammes surmises that future wars will be engagements fought across the spectrum of human activity and that antagonists will fight in the political, economic, social, and military arenas and communicate their messages through a combination of networks and mass media. and Afghanistan. The military must always be prepared to conduct full spectrum dominance but can no longer plan a post-conflict order independent of the course of the war and the damage inflicted.
The Joint community is currently discussing whether Effects Based Operations can provide the operational framework for the U.S. military to win both a war and the following peace.
19 Future warfighting constructs must view warfare holistically where all elements of national power are employed. Most importantly future warfighting constructs must plan postconflict conditions of an enemies country and population as desired effects and must be incorporated in order to define boundaries within the operational commander's warfighting decisions both in pre-conflict and during execution.
Methodology
The research question examines whether EBO within the framework of JOW is the most effective way to frame future joint operations in a complex, uncertain environment. 20 Though, much of the leading thought on EBO has been drawn from the work of Air Force thinkers and USAF concept centers, it has been embraced by JFCOM. To answer the basic question of whether EBO provides a common operational framework for future joint operations, this paper must first provide a basic understanding of the historical evolution of EBO and then provide a commonly agreed upon definition. The paper will then provide a brief discussion of the theory 22 To understand the problems associated with the concept of EBO, this paper first addresses its historical evolution.
Historical Origins
The confusion associated with the concept of EBO is attributed to its evolution as a concept and the resulting difference of versions and definitions. To better understand EBO, this paper attempts to review the historical evolution of EBO to determine whether it is a new concept or just an old idea renamed and repackaged. This chapter utilizes historical evolution of the concept to offer a perspective on the future usefulness and thinking about EBO. It will dispel the notion that EBO is a new concept. Rather it will discuss the evolutionary process and technological advances that have developed EBO as a concept. PGMs, which could engage multiple targets simultaneously making strategic attack all the more feasible, brought this about.
Concept Evolution
COL John Warden
The technological advances including the combination of stealth, precision, improved Figure 1 fires and effects coordination center, takes into account Colonel Wardens concepts in focusing organizational changes designed to employ fires, lethal and non-lethal, to create desired effects.
Because the Army is focused on EBO solely as an aspect of fires, it is severely limiting the concept of EBO in comparison to current analysis. Current analysis has evolved due to work done by Major General David A. Deptula.
MG Dave Deptula
Major General David A. Deptula built on Colonel Warden's methodology to develop practical approaches to targeting and the employment of air power. His first article titled "Effects-Based Operations: Change in the nature of Warfare," was largely based upon Colonel
Warden's initial concepts of parallel warfare. However, he expanded Colonel Warden's views of EBO from being USAF Service centric to being applicable across all national powers to include diplomatic, informational, and economic. Most importantly, he placed more emphasis on the understanding of the enemy as a system, and the determination of the linkages between cause and effect. His expanded concept offers better potential for the military to achieve desired effects through a more holistic and systematic approach to planning, executing, and assessing results.
This expanded view provides more efficient ways to achieve national goals and allows us to consider shaping the environment to minimize challenges to U.S. interests.
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General Deptula's expansion of EBO into a way of thinking proposes an alternative concept of war based on control rather than the traditional concepts of annihilation and attrition taught in service schools. His concept of control is similar to Warden's five ring model in which the destruction of enemy military forces are less important than creating the effect necessary to prevent an enemies organizational structure to operate as desired. He proposes a systems approach in defeating the enemy by focusing targeting not necessarily on the destruction of enemy systems but rather on the prevention of the intended use as the adversary desires. 36 In this sense, he maintains that desired effects will be achieved through the successful application of force whether military or non-military to gain control of systems on which the enemy relies.
General Deptula's work has matured EBO as a concept and has forced other organizations to begin taking it seriously.
Joint Forces Command
Joint actions. This broadened and refined definition of EBO provides exponential possibilities to improve our way of employing and using military power throughout the spectrum of conflict.
Essentially EBO enhances decision-making in accordance with national security requirements across the spectrum of conflict. This is important because in competition, the system that can outthink and adapt faster will prevail. The current definition of EBO provides the U.S. the ability to integrate all instruments of power into a "deliberate, coherent, precise and timely manner to dictate policy effects -whether managing cooperation or conflict. of adaptation where the current course of action is validated or modified which is brought together as the final stage of knowledge. As described in this process, EBO is a way of thinking and systematically planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects and or reach a desired future state.
This thought process is critical because just as important to establishing a joint definition is the necessity to establish a common joint language because currently there are no formally established procedures in the EBO methodology and very few formally defined EBO terms. 45 To make the concept more confusing, the Air Combat Command's white paper identified that "EBO are only discussed to a limited extent in U.S. military doctrine today, and no methodology is offered to systematically apply it." 46 This paper will discuss proposed methodologies that differentiate between ends and means and can be applied across every level of action to include strategic, operational, and tactical. First, this paper will propose a methodology based upon the definition of effects in the sense that "effects can physically, functionally, or psychologically impact the enemy and coerce or compel him to change his behavior and eventually lead to desired outcomes." 47 By focusing on the enemy as a complex adaptive system (CAS) in which a desired effect or outcome must be coerced or compelled this paper begins to outline the need for establishing a desired end state of the CAS and then determining the actions needed to alter that system.
Implementation
Strategic level of action
The JFCOM White Paper asserts: "If we can plan, execute, assess and adapt our actions in terms of the effects we desire, then we can identify and execute the most effective course of action to bring about the desired change in the adversary's behavior. becomes, what are the effects we desire. The determination of the effects or the desired end state occurs at the strategic level of action. It is important to understand the rationale for our choices if the political aim is to change the adversary's behavior. This is where EBO shows the most potential because this is where policies are initiated by the direction given by the president and his National Security council (NCS). These policies must be focused on the adversary's power in order to weaken or transform it and thus achieve our desired political objectives.
EBO contributes extensively at the strategic planning process by providing a clearer understanding of the value of instruments of power that are available and providing a more integrated role of intelligence within the process. EBO helps agency planners to think differently about their agency's contribution to the overall success of the strategy. Additionally EBO provide improved communications and understanding among planners thus creating stronger linkages of assets and better anticipation of capabilities and outcomes. All of these contributions help measure progress and facilitate future planning. However, EBO will not end with planning, but will require continuous strategic adaptation and continuous refinement of agency roles to achieve long-term policy aims.
The Strategic level of action is the most important aspect of EBO because it is where policy makers provide a clear vision of the end state, which is then translated into national objectives, or strategic effects that will ultimately define a successful operation. First policy makers must think about, understand the enemy, friendly, and neutral's perceptions, and anticipate decisions. To ensure that the envisioned end state is capable of being met, policy makers must also match options, capabilities and effects so the most advantageous instrumentsdiplomatic, economic, law enforcement and, or military -are selected and resourced. 49 In a key note address titled "A policy-makers view of Effects Based Operations," Mr. Hawley stated that "Consequently, at the strategic level the most important responsibility of the policy makers is to force and finally to the functional components. An additional problem is the full integration of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to support this assessment process.
The USJFCOM white paper version 1.0 states that the inherent shortfall of EBO is that "Effects-based operational art deals mainly in the realm of command." 53 This intent is well intentioned but currently inadequate to ensure operational planning is effective. Planners will be required to establish a common interagency visualization of the battle space to determine how enemy, friendly, and neutral systems are currently interacting. Currently organizational structures are adapting to ensure adequate interaction and support between the strategic, operational and interagency, military. Without this interaction, the operational planner would be required to conduct assumption based planning which would jeopardize future decisions. Planning that would be required would include risk assessment and the development of operational effects and measures to determine success and focus future operations.
Current tools that allow the commander to change desired effects into military tasks include the following: the Effects Tasking Order (ETO) and the Priority Effects List (PEL).
Additionally a conceptual tool that continues to evolve is the Integrating Task/Effects Matrix (ITEM). "Components execute tasks (which they helped develop) to support their effects tasking order (ETO), assigned effects-based missions and conduct additional planning prior to execution to more succinctly tie tactical units into the operation… An integration matrix is part of the ETO.
It is the synchronization of component actions in time, space, and outcome gains increased importance in effects-based operations."
55
Because EBO attempts to achieve synergy between the elements of national power, capabilities of the military, and the ultimate process of thinking, planning, deciding, acting, receiving feedback, measuring and modifying then it makes sense to have an automated and visual way to track and understand these interactions. 56 The Integrating Task to develop tools to measure the magnitude and impact of potential problems for national security.
We must also develop models that can play out a long temporal dimension because current models have a problem with time. Finally, we must develop methods to examine the two questions of how to measure national will and how to achieve decision superiority and how to measure it. 
ANALYSIS
This paper attempts to answer whether EBO within the framework of JOW is the most effective way to frame future joint operations in a complex, uncertain environment.
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To do so it must analyze the utilization of EBO as a systematic approach within the continuous operational cycle of analysis, planning, execution, and assessments based on realized outcomes Knowledge Superiority -A condition created by knowledge that enables one side in a struggle to make better decisions than its adversary, thereby creating momentary advantages.
Knowledge Readiness -A status of the constituent elements comprising a leader's knowledge environment, which contribute to the determination of both capabilities and preparedness of a command or organization to seek, find, and sustain knowledge advantage.
Knowledge Management -Purposeful and systematic quest for quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of knowledge to support decision-making brought about by retrieving, processing, organizing, analyzing, synthesizing, and sharing data, information, and knowledge among knowledge workers, leaders, and organizations. to anticipate what the adversary will do, when he will do it, where he will act, that could enable us to 'be there waiting when he acts,' and provides feedback on the effects created by those actions." 67 These definitions provided the construct in which EBO was utilized because it is the commander who is required to make effective decisions, which now involve a wider range of people, organizations, and stakes. EBO provided the linkage between decisions, actions, and desired effects. EBO is a knowledge-based operation 64 Ibid., Slide. 5. The MORS workshop provided two distinct areas of understanding within the evolution of EBO as a concept. The workshop outlined the basic principles of EBO which maintain that:
(1) warfare should include all the instruments of national power and (2) each instrument should be applied in a way that maximizes its desirable impacts, minimizes undesirable ones, and complements actions taken in other arenas. 70 Secondly, the workshop further concluded there are two crucial differences between EBO and the ways we have been thinking in the past. The first is that EBO challenges us to move from an era of increasing Jointness to an era of "Meta-Jointness" that integrates DoD's actions into coherent sets of actions that involve a broader set of participants (e.g., interagency and coalition partners, International Organizations (IOs), Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs). The second is that EBO requires both greater knowledge and greater capability to deal with uncertainty than traditional military operations. operations." 72 In summary, the workshop provided insight to each issue but determined that a great deal more analysis must be done.
The workshop determined that "Effects Based Operations, as a broad organizing concept, appears promising as an approach that will help decision makers in DoD and other organizations in the national security arena to protect US national interests and achieve US goals." 73 The workshop concluded with recommended changes that would support the implementation of EBO within DoD. These recommended changes included areas such as education, information sharing, joint and interagency integration, creation of databases and support for analysis and units of measurement. Though the groundwork has been laid, full implementation of the EBO concept will not be easy. Machiavelli states: "There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things." 89 It is clear that the implementation of EBO within the Joint construct provides distinct advantages; it also poses numerous challenges for individual services. The following recommendations are based on a qualitative analysis. This qualitative approach generated theory from observations that were based on primary source material in the form of government documents and secondary sources such as books, journals and periodical articles, and monographs. Additionally, interviews with senior leaders and subject matter experts were used to supplement the research.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Challenges associated with the implementation of EBO include procurement of compatible C4ISR systems, effective war gaming or modeling tools that accurately portray the intangibles of effects, and the requirement for the integration of joint, hard realistic training.
Service doctrine must be expanded to ensure a synergy between elements of national power, capabilities of our services, domains in which we operate, and the processes of thinking, planning, deciding, acting, receiving feedback, measuring and modifying.
Modeling and simulation to support EBO must change. Future modeling must support both tangible and intangible effects enactment and assessment over differing periods of time. As stated by Mr. Watts, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation on the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "I believe focusing on higher-level effects is the right direction for the American military…However, we should not kid ourselves about the inherent difficulties of quantifying, much less predicting, emergent effects." 90 The need for this anticipatory assessment and highorder analysis may be one of largest conceptual problems facing implementation of EBO.
EBO as defined by JFCOM is a conceptual process and "because the conceptual thinking skills required by practitioners of effects-based operations will change the way the military must develop and train leaders," the military will be required to invest in the continued development of the intellects of its members throughout their careers. 91 Because producing knowledge is expensive and time intensive, the military must determine what knowledge is necessary to enable fast and effective decisions. EBO will require extensive conceptual development, years of education and training, reorganization of many planning and assessment functions, and development and application of advanced technologies of many kinds. "Without the intellectual capabilities to synthesize, to view the environment holistically, to be creative, and to be inquisitive, the great potential of EBO will not be realized."
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"The evolutionary, refined, and broadened concept of EBO has large potential to improve the way of employing Army forces and using military power." 93 Upon completion of analysis, EBO will allow the U.S. to transform the nature of warfare by embracing all elements of national power in an integrated and focused methodology. Because EBO has far reaching implications across the range of military operations throughout each service and in joint and coalition operations, it must be capable of institutionalizing across the levels of command a holistic approach to warfighting founded on a systems perspective of the battle space and the integrated application of various instruments of power. EBO shows great promise as a broad organizing concept, which will help transformation of our military forces and help to define a new way of thinking and a new way to fight.
Suggested Further Research
In the process of researching and writing this monograph, several related topics surfaced that warrant further research. These topics will add to the body of research regarding EBO and its implementation within joint doctrine: 
